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Abstract: In a recent article, “Vaccine Refusal Is Not Free Riding”, Ethan 
Bradley and Mark Navin (2021) argue that vaccine refusal is not akin to 
free riding. Here, I defend one connection between vaccine refusal and 
free riding and suggest that, when viewed in conjunction with their oth-
er arguments, this might constitute a reason to mandate Covid-19 vac-
cination. 
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In their recent, illuminating contribution to the ethics and economics of 
Covid-19, Ethan Bradley and Mark Navin (2021) provide us with several 
reasons to doubt the received view that we can essentially view vaccine 
refusal as a free rider problem. Bradley and Navin contend that from 
both the subjective perspective of those who refuse vaccines, and also 
viewed objectively, there are several important differences between vac-
cine refusal and classic free riding. In making these distinctions, they 
draw attention to differences between the subjective views of many vac-
cine refusers and the views that we would expect to see among free rid-
ers, with important implications for how we should go about addressing 
the problem of vaccine refusal. However, their argument that vaccine 
refusers cannot be thought of as free riders in an objective sense—
because it is not possible to both contribute to and benefit from the 
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public good of herd immunity1—does not go through, particularly when 
it comes to Covid-19. Drawing this out can help us to better understand 
the various goals of a vaccination programme against Covid-19. Defend-
ing this particular parallel between vaccine refusers and free riders is 
also important because, in combination with the other arguments pro-
vided by Bradley and Navin, it says something about how we (in both a 
moral and a practical sense) should go about dealing with the problem 
of Covid-19 vaccine refusal. 
 
THE ARGUMENT AGAINST VIEWING VACCINE REFUSAL AS FREE RIDING 
The existence of ‘public goods’—that is, goods that are non-rivalrous 
and non-excludable—gives rise to the free rider problem. Because these 
goods are non-excludable, individuals may benefit from them whether 
or not they contribute to their provision. The fact that it is thus rational 
to benefit from a public good without contributing to it—that is, to be a 
‘free rider’—coupled with the fact that if enough people refuse to con-
tribute, the conditions for the existence of these goods are undermined, 
is the ‘free rider problem’. As Bradley and Navin (2021, 170) note, mass 
vaccination creates the public good of herd immunity. Although no 
country has yet passed the threshold for herd immunity, we can hope 
that current vaccination programmes will soon allow it to be achieved 
(at least in some places). Even where a fixed threshold has not been 
achieved, however, we might argue that vaccination still contributes to a 
public good, by slowing the spread (and resultant consequences of in-
fection) to some degree—herd immunity, in other words, is not an all-or-
nothing proposition (see Yates 2021).2 The non-vaccinated benefit from 
herd immunity, because herd immunity makes outbreaks of the disease, 
and thus one’s chances of getting infected, more unlikely, even in the 
absence of individual protection. 
 
1 For good reason, Bradley and Navin (2021, 168n1) prefer the term ‘community pro-
tection’ to ‘herd immunity’. Although I agree with their reasons, here, I am using the 
more widely recognized term. 
2 In addition, even if we accept that there is no public good in existence until we reach 
a certain threshold for herd immunity, we might still posit that there is an obligation 
to bring this public good into existence. While this would not be an obligation to avoid 
free riding (which would seem to already require the existence of a public good that 
some individuals are unjustly benefitting from), some argue that a duty of fairness 
obligates us to contribute to the creation of the public good of herd immunity (see 
Navin 2013; Giubilini, Douglas, and Savulescu 2018). This would still suggest that indi-
viduals can be held accountable for unjustly refusing to contribute to the benefit of 
herd immunity, which should suffice to support this paper’s conclusion about how we 
should deal with the problem of vaccine refusal. 
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It would seem, then, to be a straightforward matter to conclude that 
individuals who enjoy the benefits of herd immunity without having 
participated in mass vaccination campaigns are free riders. Bradley and 
Navin, however, provide us with two strands of argument against this 
conclusion. First, they contend that vaccine refusers “do not have the 
subjective beliefs and attitudes of free riders” (2021, 171). In order to be 
free riders in this subjective sense, Bradley and Navin argue, vaccine re-
fusers must acknowledge that they are indeed benefitting from the pub-
lic good in question, and they must recognise that they are refusing to 
make some reasonable contribution towards this public good. Both of 
these attitudes, Bradley and Navin point out, are not characteristic of 
vaccine refusers. Vaccine refusers often both hold vastly overblown be-
liefs about the risks of vaccination (so that they do not view the costs of 
vaccination as a ‘reasonable’ contribution) and believe that there are no 
benefits to mass vaccination (thus denying that it produces a public 
good). It is important to point out the subjective differences between a 
‘classic’ free rider and a ‘classic’ vaccine refuser because, as Bradley and 
Navin point out, it has implications for appropriate public policy re-
sponses. If—as would be the case with the classic free rider—an individ-
ual already believes that herd immunity is valuable and beneficial, and 
that the costs of contributing to this are not prohibitive, relatively minor 
changes to the individual’s incentive structure (in the form of either re-
wards or punishments) could lead them to view contribution to the pub-
lic good as indeed in their best interests. Where individuals believe that 
the costs are extremely high, and no good will be produced as a result of 
their contribution, this strategy is not likely to yield the same results 
(we will return to the further significance of this presently). 
The second strand of argument revolves around the objective crite-
ria for free riding. Here, Bradley and Navin focus more on the moral ob-
ligation to contribute to a public good (rather than on what might moti-
vate people to do so effectively). Where individuals are free riders, the 
authors note, they are refusing to contribute to something that they are 
benefitting from, and thus should also be contributing to.3 But, Bradley 
and Navin contend, it is not possible to both contribute to and benefit 
from the public good of herd immunity. One can contribute to herd im-
munity through possessing individual immunity (which one can gain ei-
ther by being vaccinated, or by contracting and recovering from a dis-
ease). But once a person has individual immunity, they need not (indeed, 
 
3 Bradley and Navin also provide another argument here—we will return to this below. 
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cannot) rely on herd immunity for protection. Because it is not possible 
to both contribute to and benefit from the public good of herd immuni-
ty, we cannot accuse vaccine refusers of behaving in an unjust manner 
by benefitting from something that they should also be contributing to. 
 
THE BENEFITS OF CONTRIBUTING TO COVID-19 HERD IMMUNITY 
This argument, however, oversimplifies the benefits that herd immunity, 
particularly against Covid-19, confers on each member of the communi-
ty. One of the primary challenges of Covid-19, and the chief goals of 
public policy, has been to prevent hospital systems from becoming 
overwhelmed (Giubilini, Savulescu, and Wilkinson 2021; Johnson et al. 
2020). The additional strain on healthcare systems (even when they are 
still functioning to a degree) during the pandemic has led to severe de-
lays and disruptions in accessing needed medical care for unrelated 
conditions (see, for example, The Lancet Rheumatology 2021; Riera et al. 
2021). Vaccination against Covid-19 does not confer any protection 
against contracting an unrelated illness and finding oneself unable to 
access medical care. Thus, in contributing to herd immunity by being 
vaccinated against Covid-19, each individual contributes to something 
that he also benefits from—a functioning healthcare system.  
One might solve this problem by making the good at stake excluda-
ble—limiting healthcare access only to those who have contributed to 
the maintenance of the healthcare system by being vaccinated—but 
there are very good moral reasons not to exclude people from access to 
healthcare (see Feinberg 1986). If we treat access to healthcare as a non-
excludable good, it generates a problem akin to the free rider problem—
each individual benefits from its existence, and a widespread failure to 
contribute to its maintenance (by being vaccinated) will undermine the 
conditions for its existence. Although healthcare resources are, unlike 
public goods, rivalrous (too many individuals failing to vaccinate will 
lead to an overconsumption of limited healthcare resources, undermin-
ing the functioning of the system)—the essential parallel here remains. 
A functioning healthcare system is something that each individual can 
benefit from and contribute to, and there is thus plausibly an obligation 
to contribute to its maintenance through being vaccinated against 
Covid-19. 
A second benefit that herd immunity confers on the community is 
an absence of the need for restrictions on the general population, which 
we have seen to varying degrees in many countries over the course of 
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the pandemic. These have included restrictions on the number of people 
who can meet in public or private, requirements to wear masks in cer-
tain spaces, the closure of or restrictions on the operation of businesses, 
the closure of schools and workplaces, and restrictions on international 
movement (Askitas, Tatsiramos, and Verheyden 2021). Some of these 
restrictions could be conditioned on vaccination status (that is, they are 
excludable)—being admitted to a foreign country, for example, or being 
able to eat at a restaurant, might be made contingent on showing proof 
of vaccination rather than restricted for all. But many of these re-
strictions—for example, most of those imposed in the UK until July 
2021 (BBC News 2021)—were not made contingent on vaccination status 
despite high vaccination rates, perhaps due to the difficulty of checking 
the vaccination status of every unmasked person in a crowded area, or 
person in a group above a certain size. Where governments deem it nec-
essary to impose general restrictions on the population in order to stop 
the spread of Covid-19, being vaccinated contributes to conditions that 
allow for the lifting of such restrictions, and this provides benefits for 
every member of the population. 
A third way in which one can contribute to and benefit from a mass 
vaccination programme stems from the fact that high levels of vaccina-
tion reduce the probability of viral variants arising. If sustained trans-
mission of Covid-19 is not contained, the likelihood of viral mutation 
increases. This can lead to vaccinations becoming less effective, and 
could even result in the emergence of a vaccine-resistant strain of the 
virus (Rubin 2021). In being vaccinated, therefore, you are contributing 
not just to herd immunity for the virus through your individual immuni-
ty; you are also contributing to the prevention of variants that you may 
not have individual protection against. In this way, one can both con-
tribute to, and benefit from, the public good of herd immunity. 
 
HOW SHOULD WE RESPOND TO VACCINE REFUSAL? 
Drawing out the ways in which individuals can benefit from herd im-
munity to Covid-19, while contributing to this public good through be-
ing vaccinated, highlights the various and vital goals of Covid-19 mass 
vaccination programmes. The benefits of herd immunity through mass 
vaccination are not limited to the protection of the population against 
infection and the adverse side effects of Covid-19, but include access to 
a functioning healthcare system, a lack of ongoing restrictions, and pro-
tection against the emergence of future variants. 
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But preserving the argument that vaccine refusers are benefiting 
from something that they can and should also be contributing to also 
lends credence to the contention that vaccine refusers may be morally 
culpable for refusing to contribute to herd immunity through vaccina-
tion. If we think that vaccine refusers can be held responsible for their 
refusal to contribute despite the fact that they may hold false beliefs 
about vaccination (as do, for example, Brennan 2018 and Giubilini, 
Douglas, and Savulescu 2018), this might support incentivising or even 
compelling individuals to contribute to the goal of herd immunity 
(where the costs of doing so are reasonable—see Bradley and Navin 
2021, 176). This is bolstered by another argument Bradley and Navin 
offer against viewing vaccination as a free rider problem in an objective 
sense—they claim that “free riding is individually rational, but vaccine 
refusal is not”. That is, they contend, because serious complications 
from vaccines are exceedingly rare, “it is almost always in a person’s in-
terest to vaccinate, even when community protection makes their odds 
of infection very low” (2021, 173). In incentivizing or mandating vac-
cination, we would therefore not be imposing unreasonable burdens on 
the individual—in fact, each individual would be likely to benefit from 
this, beyond the benefits entailed by herd immunity. 
Reintroducing Bradley and Navin’s arguments against viewing vac-
cine refusal as free riding in a subjective sense might further steer our 
sense of what could constitute an appropriate and effective policy re-
sponse. To recap, Bradley and Navin suggest that because vaccine refus-
ers often do not see mass vaccination as producing any benefit, and be-
cause they believe the individual costs of vaccination are very high, our 
typical response to classic free rider problems—introducing incentives 
to contribute to the agreed-upon public good—is not likely to work ef-
fectively here. This might be thought to point us, at least prima facie,4 in 
the direction of mandating, rather than incentivizing, vaccination where 
we have problems achieving or approaching the public good of herd 
immunity. 
Scrutiny of Bradley and Navin’s arguments is thus a useful exercise 
in considering what constitutes effective and justifiable vaccination pol-
 
4 This is certainly not to say that this alone is sufficient to point us in this direction—
several practical considerations may speak against such a policy. To take just one ex-
ample, compulsory vaccination policies could lead vaccine refusers to avoid seeking 
medical care for themselves and their children (Flanigan 2014). For a comprehensive 
defense of vaccine compulsion, including sustained discussion of such practical con-
siderations, see Flanigan (2014) and Giubilini (2020). 
WHITE / CRITICAL COMMENT  
 
ERASMUS JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY AND ECONOMICS aa 
icy for Covid-19. I have argued, against Bradley and Navin, that the ethi-
cal argument that Covid-19 vaccine refusers are unjustly refusing to 
contribute to the benefit of herd immunity retains its force once we take 
a broader view of the resultant benefits. Vaccine refusers might thus be 
morally culpable for failing to contribute to the various significant bene-
fits that herd immunity to Covid-19 provides. Coupled with Bradley and 
Navin’s compelling arguments that incentivizing vaccination may be of 
limited use, and that vaccine refusal is rarely in the best interests of the 
individual, this could be viewed as lending support to the case for 
Covid-19 vaccine mandates where the public good of herd immunity 
cannot be achieved through other means. 
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